Glenn Snyder’s concept of the “Stability–Instability Paradox.”

Deterrence Stability Debate: Sub-Conventional Conflict under a Nuclear Backdrop

(~200 words | Thinker: Glenn Snyder)

The Deterrence Stability Debate has regained prominence in South Asia after recent military operations conducted below the threshold of full-scale war, often discussed in the context of a nuclear backdrop. This debate is best explained through Glenn Snyder’s concept of the “Stability–Instability Paradox.”

According to Snyder, when two rival states possess nuclear weapons, the fear of mutual destruction creates strategic (nuclear) stability at the highest level. Nuclear weapons deter all-out war because escalation risks are catastrophic and unacceptable. However, this very stability at the nuclear level can produce instability at lower levels of conflict, such as sub-conventional warfare, limited military strikes, proxy conflicts, cyber operations, or cross-border actions.

In the South Asian context, post-Operation Sindoor discussions highlight how states may feel emboldened to undertake calibrated, limited military actions, assuming that the opponent will avoid escalation to the nuclear level. The belief that nuclear deterrence “caps” escalation encourages risk-taking below the nuclear threshold, thereby increasing the frequency of limited conflicts.

This paradox poses serious challenges for deterrence management. While nuclear weapons prevent large-scale wars, they do not automatically ensure overall peace. Misperception, miscalculation, or signaling failures during sub-conventional conflicts can still trigger unintended escalation. Thus, the Stability–Instability Paradox remains central to understanding contemporary security dilemmas in nuclearized regions like South Asia.